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From Simple Machines to Eureka in Four
Not-So-Easy Steps. Towards Creative
Visuospatial Intelligence.
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Abstract This chapter builds an account of the cognitive abilities and mechanisms
required to produce creative problem-solving and insight. Such mechanisms are
identified in an essentialized set of human abilities: making visuospatial inferences,
creatively solving problems involving object affordances, using experience with pre-
viously solved problems to find solutions for new problems, generating new con-
cepts out of old ones. Each such cognitive ability is selected to suggests a princi-
ple necessary for the harder feat of engineering insight. The features such abilities
presuppose in a cognitive system are addressed. A core set of mechanisms able to
support such features is proposed. A unified system framework in line with cogni-
tive research is suggested, in which the knowledge-encoding supports the variety of
such processes efficiently.
1 Introduction
We are still far from building machines that match human-like visuospatial intel-
ligence, creative problem solving, or the more elusive trait of insight. Creativity
and creative problem-solving have fascinated humans ever since individuals able
to wield such skills with great prowess have existed, generating many legends and
anecdotes. Thus Archimedes is said to have had the insight of how to measure the
volume of a crown while immersing himself in a bathtub (Vitruvius Pollio, 1914).
Watson has recounted to have dreamt of spiral staircases before settling on the dou-
ble helix solution for the problem of the structure of DNA. In a speech given at the
German Chemical Society, Kekule´ mentioned to have day-dreamt an Ouroboros-
like snake biting its tail or a tibetan knot before discovering the structure of benzene
(Fig. 1).
These introspective and sometimes second-hand accounts cannot be taken as
facts, but as descriptions of various phenomenological experiences of insight in
problem-solving (or assumptions about these experiences if the account is second-
hand).To discriminate the myth from the fact studies in empirical settings on insight
problem-solving and creativity have been employed (Maier, 1931; Duncker, 1945)
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Fig. 1 A depiction of Kekule´’s day-dream: a) The benzene molecule; b) Ouroboros symbol of a
serpent eating its own tail; c) Tibetan knot.
and creativity tests developed (Kim (2006) offers a review of one of the most used
such tests - TTCT - the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking).
Yet some of these accounts coalesce in their narrative, pointing at similar phe-
nomenology. This invites the question whether such similar phenomenology is the
result and indicator of a certain set of cognitive processes or the phenomenological
narrative converges because a narrative schema1 about insight has become ingrained
in our culture. If the answer is the former, these accounts might hold some reverse-
engineering potential for cognitive and AI scientists, which could work their way
back from phenomenological effects 2, using as a lead the cognitive processes that
have generated them, to further decypher the hidden mechanisms of insight.
Phenomenological complications aside, insight and creative problem-solving
generally figure amongst the pinnacle of human cognitive abilities (other animals are
capable of creative tool use (Ko¨hler, 1976) and some analogy-making (Gillan et al,
1981), however we are unaware of any experimental set-up able to test for insight
in animals). Individuals able to produce great leaps of thought seem to have always
existed among us (Watson, 2005, 2011), yet creative problem-solving is something
many normal human beings do on a day-to-day basis - when putting a new mecha-
nism together out of known parts, improvising a tool when lacking one, coming up
with new ideas, concepts and strategies, adapting older problem-solving strategies
to new situations. Compared to the achievements of other primates or artificial intel-
ligence agents, even the smallest human creative intelligence accomplishments are
remarkable.
We define productive cognition (cf. Wertheimer (1945)) as the general ability
to create new knowledge, concepts, tools and objects, mechanisms, theories and
1 Several different proposals which aim to summarize all macro-narratives exist, a compelling one
being offered by Booker (2004), however for a computational treatment of micro narrative schemas
see Chambers and Jurafsky (2010). In the context of insight, the established narrative schema could
be about inspiration that comes to the discoverer after a lot of work in a spontaneous flash, in which
various parts of the problem are “perceived” together with similar inspiration-conducive objects.
2 This can hold true only if the imagery which accompanies insight is real and in direct relation
to the causal processes of insight - i.e. visual imagery is perceived because visual components
of concepts are activated and worked upon with visual and other processes in order to propose a
solution
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systems of thought. The emphasis here is on producing a new object or a solution
that has not existed or was not known or experienced before. Research into creativ-
ity, creative problem-solving and insight, all aspects of productive cognition, has
valuable potential impact for both AI and cognitive science. The engineering appli-
cations are related to smarter, more robust AI systems, which can solve tasks in new
environments with higher flexibility and an ability to adapt their previous knowl-
edge to the new problems they encounter. Ideally these agents should be able to
produce new information (concepts, theories, new relevant relations, hypotheses on
how to represent problems), the usability of which can then be tested by classical
computational paradigms. The benefits for cognitive science are in what the compu-
tational modeling of and experimentation with such abilities can tell us about how
they function in their natural state in human cognition.
For artificial systems, creative problem-solving poses a high complexity chal-
lenge, bringing about the question how new types of knowledge and hypotheses can
be created that are actually useful, other than by logical inference. For cognitive
science, the issue is rather what kind of representations and processes enable the
functioning of such abilities. These two questions connect and this chapter deals
with them in tandem.
A unified framework (Newell, 1994) aimed at exploring and implementing
cognitively-inspired creative problem-solving and insight is proposed. Here the sci-
entific interest is focused on determining what kind of knowledge representation-
processing pairs can generally support a variety of creative problem-solving pro-
cesses with more ease than previous computational paradigms. To determine such
types of knowledge representation and processes, an essential set of cognitive abil-
ities and the features they presuppose in a cognitive system is analysed. These
abilities each illuminate a different cognitive mechanism needing implementation
in order to reach higher abilities in productive systems. The way all these mech-
anisms can be integrated to participate in the higher-level abilities of creative
problem-solving and insight is then shown. Furthermore, the framework is con-
structed on an initial visuospatial inference ability, which if replicated should ac-
count at the problem-solving level for similar phenomenological effects as Watson’s
and Kekule´’s accounts.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a flavor of the
matters which have preoccupied researchers in the various aspects of productive
cognition: creativity, creative problem-solving and insight, thus presenting the is-
sues involved in the construction of a creative problem-solving framework. Sec-
tion 3 defines such a framework in four steps, elaborating on the cognitive features
which need implementation and proposing knowledge organization and knowledge
processing mechanisms, in a path from visuospatial intelligence to insight. Section
4 concludes the chapter with a discussion about the cognitive abilities the system
presupposes as essential, a birds-eye view about how the mechanisms that are pro-
posed at each level interact, and future work required to implement, test and refine
this theoretical framework.
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2 Aspects of productive cognition: creativity, creative
problem-solving and insight
2.1 Creativity and creative problem-solving
Boden (2003) distinguishes between historical creativity (h-creativity), which pro-
duces results original on the scale of human history, and psychological creativity (p-
creativity), which yields contributions that are creative from individual perspective.
She further differentiates between combinatorial and exploratory-transformational
creativity. Combinatorial creativity is a form of producing new, unusual combina-
tions or associations out of known ideas. Exploratory-transformational creativity is
an exploration of variations, and changes to/restructuring of the conceptual space.
As the term conceptual space is not very clearly defined (Ritchie, 2001; Wiggins,
2001), its compatibility with uses by others (Ga¨rdenfors, 2004) is hard to determine.
Another lens through which creative processes are approached is that of the
difference between convergent and divergent thought (Guilford, 1967). Conver-
gent thought is assumed to employ previously known reasoning strategies, famil-
iar heuristics and data, as to arrive to an accurate, logical solution. By contrast,
divergent thought is a search for many different potential solutions, with various de-
grees of correctness, where the emphasis is on production of a diversity of possible
solutions, not on accuracy. Thus divergent thought is assumed to be creative and
associative in nature, exploring multiple possible solutions and courses of action,
and evaluating them in a quick and rough manner. Such solutions don’t need to be
logical or traditionally used heuristics - they can be associationist in nature, using
previous knowledge from different fields to enable what is popularly described by
the term of “leaps of thought”. However, this categorization is rather abstract, with
each category being able to contain many processes, and creative problem-solving
is the type of endeavor which assumes both abilities - a divergent stage to find pos-
sible different solutions, and a convergent one to follow through the consequences
of such solutions.
Implicit processes are generally considered to play an important role in creative
problem-solving, with some models focusing on explicit-implicit process interac-
tion (He´lie and Sun, 2010). The incubation stage in insight is considered to be a
process which takes place under conscious awareness. However, the relationship
between the concepts of divergent thought, implicit processing and the incubation
stage has not been clearly disseminated in the literature (though one can assume
some degree of overlap).
Important roles in creativity are played by analogy (Holyoak and Thagard, 1996)
and metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999). Both analogy and metaphor are
generally considered to be processes of transferring knowledge from a known field
(source) to a less known field (target), with various purposes, like: enriching the
unknown field, having some starting assumptions and knowledge to test, explain-
ing that field to a learner in a fashion which is connected with knowledge that the
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learner already possesses as to allow for a quick comprehension start in the new
field, aesthetical effects (with comprehension consequences).
An important aspect that any theory of creativity needs to account for is concept
generation or composition. Concept formation literature in its various forms (pro-
totype theory - Rosch (1975), exemplar theory - Medin and Shoben (1988), theory
theory - Murphy and Medin (1985)) has not traditionally dealt with aspects of con-
cept composition. More recently theories have been proposed on this matter (Aerts
and Gabora, 2005; Fauconnier and Turner, 1998). The latter, a conceptual blending
account, proposes that various elements and relations from different scenarios or
concepts are blended in an unconscious process, as to produce new concepts. This
account finds its ancestry in Arthur Koestlers concept of bisociation of matrices
(Koestler, 1964).
Concept discovery (Dunbar, 1993) and restructuring (possibly linked to Boden’s
transformational creativity processes of restructuring the conceptual space) are an
important feature in other creative cognition activities - scientific discovery (Ners-
essian, 2008; Langley, 2000; Klahr and Dunbar, 1988) and technological innovation
(Thagard, 2012).
The essential difference between creativity and creative problem-solving seems
to be one of evaluation type. Creativity is not enough to problem-solve, as an em-
phasis is put on the utility of the solution, or of the new knowledge and exploration
forms (conceptual tools, ideas) created in the problem-solving process. Ultimately,
the aesthetic and originality value of a creative solution fades in front of its utility
or lack thereof.
This adds hardship in the construction of such a system, but helps in the evalu-
ation process. The constraints bring about the benefit that utility is measured with
more ease than aesthetic value and even originality. However, a system’s ability to
propose new solutions, hypotheses or approaches towards a problem, which might
not ultimately work in practice but are valid proposals with chances of success from
a human perspective, is a good enough criterion for satisficing creative problem-
solving demands.
A specific though challenging kind of creative problem-solving which might shed
some light on the cognitive mechanisms at work is insightful problem-solving.
2.2 The general problem of insight
In the context of Boden’s taxonomy (Boden, 2003), two types of insight can be de-
termined - a p-creative one (finding the representation which can lead to solving a
problem that has been previously solved by others) and a h-creative one (finding
a new solution or problem-representation altogether, a case found in the realm of
scientific discovery and technological innovation). In order to address the issue of
knowledge organization and processes a machine would need to possess to be able
the have insight the way humans do, we will focus here on red thread features gener-
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ally associated with insight (of both kinds). We will however address this distinction
again in section 3.4.
Encyclopaedia Britannica defines insight (2014) as:
”immediate and clear learning or understanding that takes place without overt trial-and-error
testing. Insight occurs in human learning when people recognize relationships (or make
novel associations between objects or actions) that can help them solve new problems”
In Sternberg and Davidson (1996) insight is:
”suddenly seeing the problem in a new way, connecting the problem to another relevant
problem/solution pair, releasing past experiences that are blocking the solution, or seeing
the problem in a larger, coherent context”
One example of an insight problem which has been studied in empirical settings
is the candle problem (Duncker, 1945). The participant is given a box of thumb-
tacks, a book of matches and a candle. The task is to fix the lit candle on a wall so
that the candle wax won‘t drip onto the table below. The participants give various
solutions, including attaching the candle with a thumbtack to the wall, or glueing it
with part of the wax. The traditional correct solution to this problem is to use the
box of thumbtacks as a platform for the candle, and attach it to the wall using one
of the thumbtacks. The accuracy and speed of the participants in solving this prob-
lem increases when the box of thumbtacks is presented empty, with the thumbtacks
out. A possible reason for this is that participants find it harder to see the box as a
platform while its affordance as a container is already used (through the box being
full).
In Maier’s classical two string problem (Maier, 1931), the participants are put
in a room which has two strings hanging from the ceiling. Their task is to tie the
two strings together. It is impossible to reach one string while holding the other.
However, various objects are scattered across the room. The traditional solution
to this problem is to use a heavy object (normally the pliers), attach it to one of
the strings, then set that string in a pendular motion. Finding this solution can be
triggered by the experimenter touching the string, thus making salient its motion
affordance and directing the subjects to think of the string as a pendulum.
The literature on insight generally uses a four-stage process proposed by Wal-
las (1926). The four stages are: familiarization with the problem, incubation (not
thinking about the problem consciously), illumination (the moment of insight) and
verification (checking if the solution actually works in practice). Whether the il-
lumination phase presupposes sudden or incremental problem-solving processes is
still debated, and various researchers insist on the importance of various stages. A
good general set of characteristics for insight problems is proposed by Batchelder
and Alexander (2012):
1. They (insight problems) are posed in such a way as to admit several possible
problem representations, each with an associated solution search space.
2. Likely initial representations are inadequate in that they fail to allow the possi-
bility of discovering a problem solution.
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3. In order to overcome such a failure, it is necessary to find an alternative produc-
tive representation of the problem.
4. Finding a productive problem representation may be facilitated by a period of
non-solving activity called incubation, and also it may be potentiated by well-
chosen hints.
5. Once obtained, a productive problem representation leads quite directly and
quickly to a solution.
6. The solution involves the use of knowledge that is well known to the solver.
7. Once the solution is obtained, it is accompanied by a so-called “aha!” experience.
8. When a solution is revealed to a non-solver, it is grasped quickly, often with a
feeling of surprise at its simplicity, akin to an aha! experience.
The main challenge in replicating insight in artificial systems is that insight prob-
lems are not search problems in the traditional (Newell and Simon, 1972) sense. The
problems are ill-structured (Newell, 1969) for a classical search-space type of solv-
ing, and defining an appropriate representation is part of the solution (cf. Simon
(1974)). For humans, this is the point where functional fixedness gets in the way -
with solvers getting stuck in representation types which are familiar and sometimes
seem implied by the problem, but are actually inappropriate. Thus a machine repli-
cating such phenomena will have to be able to do some form of metareasoning and
re-representation.
3 A framework for creative problem-solving based on
visuospatial intelligence
Various work relates visuospatial intelligence to the creation of abstract concepts,
and to the process of abstract thought in general (Mandler, 2010; Freksa, 1991,
2013). Thus Mandler proposes that complex abstract concepts are built develop-
mentally on top of already acquired spatial concepts. This would explain the perva-
siveness of spatial templates (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999) in human metaphor,
spatial priming influences (Tower-Richardi et al, 2012) and shape bias (Landau et al,
1988; Imai et al, 1994). In his analysis of 100 scientific discoveries (Haven, 2006)
and 100 technological innovations (Philbin, 2005), Thagard (2012) draws the con-
clusion that 41 out of the 100 scientific discoveries involve visual representation
(spatial representations is unaccounted for in this analysis though some references
are made to kinesthetic ones), with the figure rising to 87 out of the 100 in the
technological innovations category. A cognitive architecture which proposes the
use of spatio-analogical representations (Sloman, 1971) in the modeling of human
spatial knowledge processing, without linking them to creative problem-solving is
Schultheis and Barkowsky (2011).
The framework proposed here takes into account the importance of visuospatial
representations and processes, starting from the general hypothesis that analogical
representations and visuospatial (and structure-oriented) processes can be a good
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representation-process pair for the recognition, manipulation and modification of
structures and relation-sets which is necessary in creative problem-solving. Such
mechanisms might also offer a bridge over the explanatory gap towards introspec-
tive imagery phenomenology which sometimes accompanies moments of insight or
creative problem-solving. The rest of this section sets to explore whether abstract
creative problem-solving mechanisms can indeed build on simple visuospatial in-
ference mechanisms.
3.1 Step 1 - Visuospatial inference
In his paper, Sloman (1971) talks about “formalisation of the rules which make
non-linguistic, non-logical reasoning possible”. He also gives an example (Fig. 2)
of visuospatial inference. Fig. 2 a) shows a mechanism made of two levers and
a pulley, the upward arrow being an indication of the initial direction of motion.
The reader should have no problem in visually inferring how the motion propagates
through the system, as to arrive at the result represented in Fig. 2 b).
Fig. 2 Sloman’s diagram of two levers and a pulley: (a) motion onset and (b) inference result.
For a human with cultural familiarity with pulleys and levers, such an inference
is visually very simple. However, we take its simplicity for granted, as it comes from
our complex visual system‘s ability to anticipate the motion of objects which it has
already learned. Visuospatial inference seems simple because it is a native feature
of the human visual system.
To be able to replicate such an ability in artificial intelligence terms, one would
have to implement some of the properties of the cognitive visual system that humans
generally take for granted. This problem could be translated in AI terms, by giving
an artificial system a subset of the six simple machines of antiquity (levers, wheel
and axle, pulleys, inclined planes, wedges and screws), together with visuospatial
and motor knowledge about each of them. The system could be asked to perform a
qualitative assessment of what a machine assembled out of some random set of these
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components will do - the way the motion will propagate via the so assembled mech-
anism. This is but a step away from Sloman’s example as it involves visuospatial
inference with multiple parts and can be thought of as a perceptual task.
This task can be solved by a system via a form of perceptual simulation. One can
encode motion affordances together with the pattern recognizer for each specific
object in such a way that seeing a certain simple machine shape triggers the antic-
ipation or simulation of motion in the artificial system. Whether the simulation of
the entire motion is necessary, or just the beginning and end result of such motion
can be accessed (once encoded) is something to be settled by cognitive empirical
investigation. The system then needs to be endowed with qualitative rules on how
motion propagation works between objects which are in contact, and the various
ways in which motion changes, or (allowed to learn from) motor simulations of
such transitions.
However, as mentioned before, this can be thought of as perceptual inference. In
order to talk about problem-solving, two other tasks can be given to the system, in
the same problem context:
– to put together a machine starting from a set of known components as to propa-
gate motion in a desired way (multiple solution possible)
– given a set of fixed components, to add missing components so that the mecha-
nism performs a certain type of motion at the end. The number of missing com-
ponents can be specified or unspecified, however they will be produced out of the
system’s memory of known machines.
Such problem-solving can rely on the same perceptual simulation (complete or
partial) and rules of motion transfer (thus can be entirely visuospatial). In fact it
could be a learning trial-and-error process of compositionally adding objects to-
gether and checking their motion affordances. The compositionality features allow
for objects to be thought of both in terms of simple machines and new composed
machines with varying motion affordances.
The implementation of such a system will solve motion anticipation problems
with simple machines, and compositionality problems with simple or composed
machines based on their capacity for motion. Besides having interesting features for
visuospatial reasoning (maybe an equivalent for a “ block-world” classical problem
setting), this problem sets the scene for the next steps towards creative problem-
solving and insight in a variety of interesting ways. It deals with simple composi-
tionality and decompositionality of objects: an object can be made of various atomic
simple machine parts and different compositionality structure can mean different
motion affordance, therefore the structure of assembly is essential. The problem can
allow for multiple solutions from the part of the solver, and it requires use and ma-
nipulation of previous knowledge structures. It is solved based on affordance and
compositionality. These features are primitives which we will relate to in the next
steps.
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3.2 Step 2 - Creative use of affordance
Humans are used to perceiving the world not just in terms of motion anticipation, but
also in terms of the affordances (Gibson, 1977) that various objects can offer a user,
depending on the task at hand. Knowledge of affordances can be considered as a part
of commonsense knowledge which displays cultural aspects (as various cultures can
be more accustomed to certain objects or tools than others). The cultural variation
element does not play a role here, as knowledge of affordances can be treated as
a knowledge database which can take whatever form, and thus belong to whatever
culture.
Of interest here is the human ability to make creative use of object affordances.
When trying to find something to pour liquid in, to carry liquid with and drink from,
in conditions in which no cup is available, humans can use a pot, a bucket, or - de-
pending on how desperate the circumstances are - a boot. When wanting to put nails
in the wall in the absence of a hammer, humans can use shoes, stones of appropriate
size, or other objects. Thus humans can creatively solve problems of the following
form: Find an object with a certain affordance, when the object(s) you normally use
is not available. Humans can find such objects even if the objects are not normally
associated with such an affordance, by speculating on the various properties objects
have, and their knowledge about the properties which are normally associated with
the affordance.
This type of problem represents a way of making creative inference and use of
the affordance properties of objects. In the following we will propose the rough
principles of a mechanism for suggesting useful objects in such problems to an
artificial agent.
Even simple visuospatial properties such as object shape can lead to inference
about affordance. The phenomenon of shape bias (Landau et al, 1988; Imai et al,
1994; Samuelson and Smith, 1999), in which children extend names from known
to unknown objects based on shape, shows that the human brain considers shape
features very important in the context of objects and tools - possibly because of a
connection between shape and affordance in these domains. In what follows, we
will propose a mechanism which makes good use of shape in proposing hypotheses,
though this can and should be refined to contain more detailed properties which are
in a direct relationship with objects’affordances.
To solve such a problem in the spirit of grounded knowledge (Barsalou and
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Barsalou, 2003; Ga¨rdenfors, 2004), we propose to repre-
sent the various objects and tools that the agent knows as distributed concepts. The
concepts are distributed over a set of spaces - an affordance space, a visual feature
space, and a semantic tag space. Each of these spaces will be organized by similar-
ity, though the similarity metric would be different, depending on what the space
contains. Thus visuospatial feature spaces will be organised in terms of feature sim-
ilarity (of shape, color), verbal tags in terms of semantic or context similarity, af-
fordance spaces in terms of motor trajectories or proprioceptive routines, etc. These
spaces could be encoded as self-organised maps (Kohonen, 1982). The recognition
of an object, or activation of a concept in such a system, would mean the associated
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activation of points or regions in these spaces (Fig. 3). Thus, each concept would be
an activation of features over different dimensions, part of which will be more sen-
sory oriented (e.g. the visual features spaces), more functionally and bodily oriented
(affordance and motor spaces), and more knowledge oriented (the semantic spaces).
Such a cognitive concept could be triggered in a variety of ways: (i) via the semantic
tag (its name), the activation of which would spread energy in the other direct links
(how the object looks like, what functions does it normally perform), (ii) via vision
input, or (iii) a query related to the affordance which is required.
We prefer such a type of knowledge encoding because the meaning of a concept
in such a system becomes grounded in the feature maps, affordance spaces and
semantic spaces which we are using (the symbolic paradigm which assumes the
meaning is in the verbal form of the concept is refused). However, the proposed
mechanism is a hybrid mechanism, as a concept can be interpreted as a symbol
(where a symbol is a collection of features, grounded in subsymbolic processes).
Fig. 3 Activation of the concept “cup” over two visuospatial feature spaces, a semantic tag space
and an affordance space.
Such knowledge organization is useful in two ways. One is that the concept can
be activated in different ways, with the entire knowledge network retained about it
becoming active. Navigation between such different types of knowledge about one
object is possible in natural cognitive systems. Such activation also implies a second
benefit, that comes from the encoding in similarity-based maps - navigation between
different encoded concepts based on different types of similarity. Thus, when a cup
is the direct activation for a certain type of affordance, other neighborhood object
shapes are activated as well, with the new object being able to act as a creative
substitute, though it might not constitute a traditional solution, nor the type of object
the user normally applies in such circumstances.
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When a request is made to the system to find an object that is required for a
certain affordance (Fig. 4), the system will first activate the corresponding concepts
linked to that affordance (the request is in fact the activation), with the most familiar
objects receiving the highest activation. Then the solution object(s) can be searched
for in the environment visually. When such a search fails, the threshold of the search
drops, and the object will search for something of a similar shape to the familiar
solution-object (by quantitative (Forsyth and Ponce, 2003) or qualitative (Falomir
et al, 2013) means) or/and to objects which are encoded closely to that object in
its shape knowledge map. Thus, creative solutions which are not what one set out
to search for exactly but can fulfill the function nonetheless can be obtained with
limited knowledge, in a visual manner.
Fig. 4 Affordance-based system in action.
3.3 Step 3 - Concept generation and structure transfer
The third step in this quest for visuospatial creative problem-solving and insight is
treated here in two parts. Part a) deals with the generation of new concepts, and part
b) with problem structure transfer.
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3.3.1 Step 3A - Generation of new concepts
Humans can make analogies, use metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999),
blend concepts (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998) and sometimes put together features
of previously known concepts to create entirely new concepts (like meme, impres-
sionism or recursive), or invent entirely new objects from previously accessible parts
or elements.
In making analogies, an important role seems to be played by concept structure
and ability to compare and structurally align source and target domain (Gentner,
1983, 2010). Spatial schemas are proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) as a pro-
cess of metaphor creation.
In the proposed framework, the relevant cognitive properties required for concept
generation are:
• Associativity of similar concepts on various feature spaces (previously explained
in step 2),
• Ability to map a structure in a different feature space, and
• Ability to build concepts compositionally.
In what follows, a few visuospatial processes which make concept generation
possible in an artificial system are proposed.
The first process consists of using a previously observed visuospatial relation as
a template. Consider an artificial intelligence system that has encoded the relation
“chaining” as a visuospatial object - starting from the analogical representation of
a chain. The relations encoded in the analogical representation of the object can be
used as a template for other units than chain links. First the relations could be extrap-
olated to similarly shaped objects - like a hoop of string and a scissor’s eye (Fig. 5).
In the proposed framework, due to visual similarity in the knowledge encoding,
such an inference would be natural. The system would thus propose to extend the
previous relation, using its template, to other visually similar objects. Such infer-
ences will hold only part of the time, but this is an example of productive reasoning
(reasoning which creates a new arrangement of objects in this case), and of trans-
forming the visuospatial analogical representation of a concept into a template for
new object arrangements.
Though initially applied to objects with similar visual features, this particular
template-relation can be applied at various levels of abstraction, up to concepts like
”chaining of events”.
Of course not all abstract concepts are derived from visuospatial analogical rep-
resentation. The point here is to show how some can be derived, as an analogical
representation is a very economic way to store relations, and can be used as a struc-
tural template for creating new concepts.
A second process that can be used for concept generation is compositionality
over such templates. Thus, take the two-tuple relation “bigger-than” as observed in
or learned from an example of two trees (Fig. 6). An artificial system could match it
by size or shape similarity, or use the principle of chaining to a second bigger than
relation of two other trees. Via compositionality, this would lead to a three (or more)
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Fig. 5 Use of analogical representation of a “chain” as a template for the “chaining” relation.
tuple relation, which would lead to a representation of the concept of “growth”. This
visuospatial representation of the concept could be used as a template again, via the
first process, and adapted to a variety of different domains.
Fig. 6 Compositionality of relation - from “bigger-than” to “growth”.
Some such visuospatial datastructures could be compressed to a small subset of
features which are consistent across templates, like an upward arrow and a definition
of contour (Fig. 7). This could be used as an iconic compressed trigger that can
activate the concept and stand in for it.
Thus analogical visuospatial representations can act as mechanisms for concept
generation by being used as templates or in applying compositional principles based
on similarity principles or visual routines. Such a system could keep track of rela-
tions between such templates based on its own experiences with concept generation
in a visuospatial semantic map (where semantic is to be understood as meaning re-
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Fig. 7 Transition from (a) growth template representation, which is (b) adapted to a different con-
cept and (c) compressed.
lations between such templates), and attempt future composition principles based
on such learning (or return to a decomposed form where necessary).
Concept blending can also be implemented by treating concepts as distributed
structures over feature spaces, in which the two concepts which participate in the
blend each contribute in a varying degree to the structure (and positioning on the
feature space) of the new concept. However, for the current purposes, the description
of creation and proposal of new structures proved to be a more interesting cognitive
feat.
3.3.2 Step 3B - Problem structure transfer
Problems like the tower of Hanoi are easily solved by people that have understood
their heuristics, no matter the shapes of the objects used in the problem presenta-
tion. This leads to the obvious conclusion that people are able to detach heuristics
from the surface features of the problem, and understand problems in terms of their
structure and the heuristics that apply to various structures. General heuristics, like
means-end analysis or divide and conquer, are routines which can be deployed in-
dependent of the domain. However, the surface features of a problem do play a role
in problem-solving, certain problems being solved with much more ease when pre-
sented in a certain visual form than in isomorphic but different feature forms (Zhang,
1997).
Thus, for humans, a case can be made for both the importance of problem struc-
ture, and the importance of surface features in problem-solving efficiency. A system
constructed in this proposed framework could deal with both, as follows. A solved
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problem can be encoded as a distributed structure over the objects and concepts
the problem contained (at a lower level their features), the algorithmic steps that
have been taken (at a lower level affordances or succesions of motor routines) and
the various relationships that have been established during this solving. In the case
of a new problem, similar on enough of the encoded properties above, the system
could trigger via a form of pattern-completion the previous problem structure - and
attempt a subset of similar steps or relation-formation.
The structure could also be elicited in a more direct fashion via remarking upon
structural similarities between the problem at hand and a previously solved prob-
lem (not on features of the participating objects), or on sets of relations which are
common to both. In both cases, the structure of a previously solved problem would
thus be transferred to the problem at hand. In case objects of the problem solution
or structure are missing, objects and concepts with similar affordances can be used
(due to the ability to de-chunk the problem offered by distributed representations).
The essential points in knowledge organization for problem structure transfer are
thus threefold:
• It requires the encoding various problem-structures together with their respective
component elements and problem-solving procedures (set of affordances, algo-
rithm)
• The ability to match problems to previously known problem-structures and their
solutions
• The ability to decompose or recompose problems, as to use different structure-
affordance pairs
The last point is further tackled in the issue of insight, when one problem represen-
tation structure is not enough.
3.4 Step 4 - Insight revisited
As previously discussed, insight is a problem of re-representation, such problems
are not solvable via normal search spaces, and their solving doesn’t seem to proceed
in a step-wise fashion: unlike in non-insight problems, the problem-solvers cannot
predict their level of progress or their closeness to the solution (Metcalfe and Wiebe,
1987).
In insight problems, it is as if finding the right problem representation is the
solution itself. A good representation affords insight directly, by providing the solver
with the ability to make the inferences which will lead to the solution. It is thus
assumed here that in such problems a form of metareasoning or meta-search happens
over the representational structures which can be fitted to the problem, in order to
find the one which most obviously affords the (inferences towards the) solution.
In many insight problems, the main problem is thus finding the right problem
structure, which is not the normal problem structure that will be ellicited by the ob-
jects presented. The various objects participating in the problem have been involved
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in the commonsense knowledge or can be involved in the commonsense inference
of a human being in a variety of problem structures, they posses a variety of affor-
dances. In this framework, insight is defined as a matter of navigating these ellicited
structure-affordance pairs until the right one is found (from which further infer-
ences can proceed to a solution). The meta-search space in this framework is richly
informed. It encodes the knowledge of the system, together with its similarity met-
rics over various spaces, and distributed structures with generative compositional
properties. The movement in such a search space happens in various dimensions via
the similarity of features, context (semantics) and affordance (function) of the dis-
tributed objects and templates. This type of knowledge encoding permits informed
search via movement through similar structures, or similar objects and the struc-
tures they are part of, and creation of new conceptual tools, relations and objects.
The right problem structure can be found when searching for a affordance, for sim-
ilar structures, relations or objects/concept sets.
A different case is that of scientific discovery problems (another variety of the
Eureka step), in which it is natural to assume that the ”right” problem representation
is not in fact found, but created. This framework allows for problem templates to be
decomposed, blended, put together, and missing parts to be created out of similarly-
affording structures, until a representation is found or created. To close the circle, in
the light of the previous steps and the knowledge encoding and processes previously
used, solving insight problems (in both forms) becomes somewhat similar to putting
simple machines together. The search this time is not one over the known set of
simple machines, for the appropriate machine or set of machines to be fitted to the
problem of obtaining a certain type of motion or affordance, but for the appropriate
problem representation, allowing for compositionality from problem representation
fragments, in order to find a problem representation which affords a solution or set
of inferences. The motor affordances of the various simple machines are replaced in
this case with the affordances the various problem templates can solve.
4 Discussion
Productive systems deal in a flexible fashion with the problems they encounter, as
to be able to propose new possible solutions based on the knowledge at hand. The
framework explored here presupposes a few cognitive properties as being essen-
tial for building efficient such productive systems. Efficiency is understood here as
computational ease of processing. The proposed framework supports through its
knowledge encoding exactly such types of search for a creative solution and re-
representation, as to account for cognitive economy principles.
One of these properties is a multidimensional (multisensorial) encoding of con-
cepts (Barsalou, 2003), which allows for dynamic memory access based on affor-
dances, visual features or semantic tags. Beside such dynamic access, distributed en-
coding of concepts allows further grounding in learned, similarity-based organized
knowledge and associativity (with traditions in hebbian learning (Hebb, 1949), se-
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mantic networks (Sowa, 1992) and associationism). Such grounding allows for easy
navigation of the knowledge space. In a sense, the knowledge space thus becomes
the equivalent of a search space in classical problem-solving. However, not all pos-
sible states or solutions are mapped. The knowledge encoding merely acts as a map
which enables the aforementioned processes to produce more knowledge in a struc-
tured, organised manner.
A connected third cognitive property assumed here as essential is flexible, re-
laxed pattern-recognizing constraints; this allows for non traditional but similar ob-
jects to be recognized and accepted as solutions. Essentially this is related to the re-
ality of our imperfect, constructive memory. Though when compared to its machine
counterparts a less than optimal part of the human experience, human memory and
its imperfections support learning, interpretation and re-interpretation, classification
and re-classification, generalization and, by extension in this framework, creativity
and creative problem-solving (rather than a perfect ability to reproduce the things
we have perceived with accuracy).
The four steps presented here construct in a coarse manner the necessary abilities
of a productive system from the ground up.
• Step one - visuospatial inference - associates visual features, shapes and struc-
tures (for the 3D case) with motion affordances, in order to enable motion an-
ticipation in a mechanism composed of simple known parts. This allows sim-
ple compositionality principles of affordance, and pattern-fill principles when a
small number of objects is given and a mechanism has to be constructed.
• Step two - creative use of affordance - extends the distributed concept encoding,
with supplying feature maps organized on similarity principles. This supports a
natural search for objects with similar features, affordances or that have been
experienced in similar contexts. The flexible threshold in pattern recognition,
together with the associativity links enable solutions to be proposed that are not
traditional.
• Step 3a) deals with processes for generating new concepts. This creates a con-
ceptual map in which some analogical representations can be used as (1) relation-
templates, (2) compositional units that together create new relations, and (3)
compression to essentialized visual features. Moreover, the map can keep track of
the generative process, and keep relations between the analogical representations
which have created new representations through such processes.
• Step 3b) discusses transfer of problem structure into a different problem, based
on affordance knowledge (and other possible similarities) of the two structures.
This gets closer to the principles of meta-representation, which is attained in step
4. Step 3b) deals with the ability to transfer a set of heuristics, or a problem
structure, rather than a small set of relations, that are enclosed in an analogical
representation, like in 3a).
• Step 4 puts all the aforementioned principles together. All concepts are grounded
in similarity-based maps, where the similarity metric depends on the type of map
itself (be it a feature map, an affordance map or a semantic context map). New
concepts, conceptual objects and sets of relations are generated as in step 3a), and
kept in relations to each other. Problem structures can be transferred in other ob-
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ject spaces. This type of knowledge representation and the aforementioned pro-
cesses allow for easy re-representation and creation of new problem templates.
The framework at this level supports meta-search over known pairs of problem-
structure and affordances, enabling the system to find a suitable representation
for the problem at hand. If no such problem-structure exists or is known, the
knowledge representation and processes allow the system to attempt and create a
problem structure compositionally out of known representations.
This framework needs to be implemented and tested. Success criteria of the system
are clearly presented in each step: visuospatial inference, creative use of affordance,
generation of new concepts, use of problem structure transfer, and solving insight
problems, or problems which require creative re-representation. There is a possi-
ble difference between the latter two. Insight problems in their reduced form might
require only finding a good representation which affords the solution - though this
representation might be quite far away from the natural representation a human
would assume for that problem. Problems requiring creative re-representation are
closer in kind to scientific discovery, technological innovation, or problems requir-
ing significant change in the conceptual space and tools of the cognitive agent. In
these cases, a new representation might need to be created out of known parts, and
only once this representation is put together, the parts afford the solution together.
Many of this framework’s principles are in line with current cognitive empirical
research and theory. However, the cognitive assumptions and and their ensuing im-
plications need to be tested, to see if the framework can hold as a cognitive theory
of creative problem-solving, or is a cognitively inspired framework for an artificial
intelligence system.
In conclusion, a theoretical framework has been proposed, with a type of knowl-
edge representation and organization meant to support in a unified manner a variety
of creative problem-solving abilities and the re-representation features necessary to
simulate insightful problem-solving. Each of the various steps has been chosen to
underlie an instrumental cognitive ability or mechanism further used in higher level
abilities. This theoretical proposal has also been linked to visuospatial types of in-
ference, which might help bridge the gap to the phenomenological experiences of
visuospatial insight.
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